Opposition Parties in Damascus Reject Accusations of Supporting the Regime

(Damascus, Syria)- Far from the battlefronts and the sounds of combat, there are some members of opposition parties in Syria who say they believe that political work can still effect change. The activity of this “internal opposition” – whose members openly criticize Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime while living in government-controlled Damascus – has led some in the opposition to accuse them of working as a “front” for the regime, even as their representatives complain that security forces target and arrest them.

One such party, Building the Syrian State (BSS) movement, announced its establishment on September 10, 2011. Heading the movement is Louai Hussein, a Syrian oppositionist who was jailed between 1984 and 1991 due to his membership in the “Communist Work Party.” He was subjected to torture during his time in prison, which he documented in his book, Loss.

According to the movement’s founding manifesto, the members “don’t necessarily share a unifying theoretical or ideological approach,” but seek nevertheless to build a “secular, democratic state.”

The movement has a public office in the Tilyani neighbourhood in the centre of Damascus that it operates without a license, despite the issuance of the “Party Law” in August 2011.

“The regime is illegal,” explains Yamen Ballan, a representative from the movement’s public relations office. “We don’t believe that we require a license from an illegal, undemocratic regime. Asking the regime for a license grants it some sort of legitimacy, something we refuse to do.”

“Openness protects you, we have nothing to hide,” he adds. “Our private discourse is the same as our public one, meaning that transparency is both our founding principle and methodology.”

Safwan Akkash, a member of the Executive Office of the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change (NCB), agrees with this approach.

“There’s nothing we’re hiding, and we refuse secret diplomacy because the big issues are always lost during secret negotiations,” he says. “We work out in the open, and this openness was hard won through our peaceful, civil activity at the beginning of the revolution.”

Several days after talking to the Damascus Bureau, Akkash was arrested on February 10 near the Lebanese border at a checkpoint manned by the Military Intelligence. He was on his way back from Beirut airport, after returning from Cairo, where he and other NCB leaders held talks with the head of the opposition Syrian National Coalition Ahmed al-Jarba about the Geneva II peace talks.

The NCB reacted to the arrest by issuing a statement, saying that “the arrest, which took place on the first day of the second round of talks at the Geneva II conference, is conclusive evidence that the regime is not seeking a political solution to stop the bloodshed of the Syrian people.”

Akkash was released two days later. In an interview with Al-Mayadeen TV, Akkash’s explanation of the arrest made it seem like the result of a misunderstanding. He said that an arrest warrant was issued in his name in August 2012 for inciting demonstrations. The warrant was annulled by three presidential amnesty decrees, but apparently the security members standing guard at the checkpoint did not know about this.

According to Akkash, all the organizations the NCB assembles under its umbrella are unlicensed, because the “regime is illegal, so why would we grant it any legitimacy by asking it for a license?”

When it was founded on June 30, 2011, the NCB brought together a dozen political parties and organizations, both Arab and Kurdish, as well as independent figures, becoming the widest alliance for the Syrian opposition, although some organizations subsequently withdrew.

The NCB offices in the Halbouni neighbourhood in central Damascus were exposed to “repeated attacks by security forces and shabiha as well as frequent campaigns of provocation,” according to Akkash.

“We receive written threats addressed directly to the heads of the NCB or to the NCB in general – there  are lists of wanted people that include members of our coordination body, as well as explicit travel bans attached to their names,” he said. “More than 200 people were denied permission to travel based on their attendance of a NCB conference, just two days after the kidnapping of Abdel Aziz al-Khayyir.”

Abdel Aziz al-Khayyir, a member of the NCB’s executive office and head of its public relations office, was arrested on September 20, 2012 along with Iyas Ayyash, a member of the Central Council, and Maher Tahhan, another member of the NCB, upon their return from a visit to China.  They have yet to be released, and there are unconfirmed reports quoting defected Airforce Intelligence officer Afaq Ahmad as saying that Khayyir died under torture.

In November 2013, Raja’ al-Nasr, secretary of the NCB, was also arrested, followed by the arrest of central council member Elias al-Mufarrij in December. Mufarrij was released on February 6.

These arrests have not prevented the members of the NCB from being accused of “collusion with the regime,” especially given the fact that since the beginning of the uprising in Syria, they haven’t overtly rejected the possibility of negotiating with Assad’s government.

There have been frequent criticisms directed at the head of the NCB, Hassan Abdel Athim, as well as against the head of the Overseas Branch, Haitham Manna, who lives in France, about their repeated appearances on satellite channels that are considered supportive of Assad, such as Al-Mayadeen TV, the Iranian Al-Alam channel and Russia Today. In December, the Internet was abuzz with debate when the opposition-leaning, Dubai-based “Orient TV” channel dubbed Haitham Manna “Iran and Russia’s Joker.” The NCB’s official website waged an online defence of Manna.

In addition, the presence in the NCB of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is closely allied with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, has caused widespread criticism among NCB’s opponents, due to the clashes between PYD fighters and the Free Syrian Army in much of Syria’s Kurdish areas.

Akkash deems these critics, “separated from reality.”

“They look at what’s happening in Syria through the eyes of media outlets lacking in objectivity, far removed from what is happening on the ground and reporting only to serve certain agendas,” he said.  “Most of them don’t know the country at all or left it at the beginning of the revolution.”

The BSS has also been accused of working for the regime, despite the arrest of many of its members over the last two years, such as Abdel Rahman Fattouh, Dara Abdallah, Javan Ayou, Rudy Ayou and Khaled Herbesh, among others.

Some oppositionists took to social media outlets to accuse Louai Hussein of being too easy on the regime after the chemical attacks on Eastern Ghouta in August 2013, after which Hussein claimed that it didn’t matter which side had undertaken the attacks, since both the regime and the armed opposition were guilty of violating human rights.

Ballan responds to the criticism levelled at the movement from abroad by maintaining that, “whoever wants to oppose the regime needs to work from within in order to gain legitimacy from the street, and any activity we undertake serves to wrest some of the public space back from the regime’s decades-long monopoly, as well as the fact that internal activity makes it very difficult, even for outside forces, to exclude us from any possible political solutions.”

According to Ballan, the movement has been working to return politics to the street; to that end, they hold a weekly political seminar that invites “politicians of different stripes united by the principle of democratic change,” as well as by organizing political activities for young people and presenting ideas that will help navigate a transitional period. The movement also seeks to address the Kurdish public by publishing their reports in Kurdish alongside the Arabic.

Many new licensed parties have emerged on the Syrian political arena, some with names that are almost interchangeable, such as the National Syrian Youth Party, Youth Party for Equality and Growth, Tadamon (Solidarity) Party, Arab Democratic Solidarity Party, Syrian Democratic Party, National Growth Party and Syria Homeland Party. Official Syrian media outlets and private ones close to the government refer to these parties as the “National Opposition,” whereas the Syrian National Coalition is referred to as the “opposition tied to outside powers.”

The activity of these parties on the ground is quite limited, as they focus on daily issues without ever challenging the foundations of the regime. For example, the members of the executive office of the Syrian Homeland Party declared a hunger strike in April 2012 as “a protest against price inflation,” while the National Syrian Youth Party protested against the Ministry of Housing’s policy of expropriating property for the state and the way issues surrounding unlicensed buildings was being dealt with.

A number of these parties, such as the Vanguard Party, the Tadamon Party and the Ansar Party, declared their intention to run in the legislative elections that were held in May 2012, then subsequently announced their withdrawal. A judicial decision was later issued against the Ansar Party to dissolve it and revoke its license, with no reason given for the decision.

On the other hand, the parties in the National Progressive Front (a political alliance run by the ruling Baath Party), are licensed in accordance with Article 35 of the Party Law.

Yamen Ballan, of the BSS, says that the movement depends financially on donations from Syrian members in Syria and abroad, in addition to funding donated by European non-governmental organisations interested in supporting civil society.

Funding for the NCB also comes from its members in Syria and abroad, according to Akkash.

“We receive some offers for funding that we refuse, something that caused a certain Arab [state] to become hostile to the NCB because of our refusal to accept any of its financial support.

Despite repeated meetings between NCB leaders with Russian diplomats since the crisis began, Akkash emphasizes the political umbrella group’s independence from Russia’s influence. He also emphasized the fact that the NCB does not accept money from Russia.

“Our financial independence is one of our strengths,” he says. “Were we to dine at the Russians’ table, they would have lost all the respect they have for us.”