An in-depth look at Syria in turmoil, part 2
The geography of the revolution
Even before the unrest in Deraa, a much smaller demonstration first took place in the old part of Damascus on March 15, where many participants were arrested. The next day, activists and the families of detainees instituted a sit-in in front of the ministry of interior, and, again, tens were arrested. The authorities were apparently terrified, to the extent that they considered it necessary to resort to violence and repression to end the protests.
From March 18, the demonstrations started to spread across the country, until the “Friday of Pride”, on March 25, hit big: in Damascus and the villages surrounding it, in Latkia, Homs, Aleppo, Deir el Zour, Rakka, Banyas and elsewhere, supporting Deraa and demanding freedom.
In some of those demonstrations, thousands participated, in others there were only hundreds, but the chants were the same all over, “God, Syria, Freedom”, “Selmiya, Selmiya (peaceful)”, and “Freedom, Freedom”. There were a variety of ages represented too, but mainly young men and women between 20 and 40 years of age.
Nevertheless, each demonstration kept its local profile. People in a city or region kept to their own area. No groups marched towards the capital. In fact, the three supposedly most effective players in the Syrian political landscape are still far from contributing to the Syrian mobilisation, and this is affecting the whole performance.
First, Aleppo, the industrial city whose residents are diversified and include Arabs and Kurds, Moslems and Christians. Up to now, Aleppo has witnessed only one small demonstration which was brutally repressed. Syrians in other parts of the country are wondering why Aleppo hasn’t yet mobilised. Some explain that the economic interests of the city’s elite work against the protest mood. This analysis, however, becomes unconvincing when one looks at the decline of Aleppo´s economy over the past few years, which hit especially the middle and lower social classes.
Damascus, too, hasn’t effectively joined the revolution yet. The demonstrations that took place in the capital so far do by no means correlate with its huge population, not to mention the concentration of university students and the fact that the city is the political and cultural centre of the country. Despite the consecutive protests in the areas all around Damascus, the momentum has not spread to the heart of the capital.
Maybe this is because of the excessive violence used to disperse the Umayyad mosque protests, where blood was spilled on holy grounds. On Friday, March 25, eyewitnesses said that the regime’s thugs used sharp weapons to hit the protestors on their heads. But that, surely, cannot be the only reason for the hushed mood in Damascus, especially that the repression of other demonstrations in other cities was also violent. Without a considerable mobilisation in the Syrian capital, the revolution will never move forward.
The third element of delay is the Kurdish society in Syria, which has always been a pioneer of street protests. Many Kurds died in the protests of 2004, while hundreds, maybe thousands, have been arrested in the years since. The Kurdish leaders decided not to participate so as not to harm the fledgling revolution since the authorities might use this Kurdish mobilisation to make accusations of separation plans and outside agendas. That was largely accepted by the Syrian opposition. But, as time passed and the demonstrations grew, the Kurdish silence became questionable. The Syrians are really fighting the feeling that the Kurds will not move unless there is a direct ethnic benefit to them. The Syrians are really counting on the Kurdish participation due to its effective street mobilisation powers, especially in the areas that are still quiet, like Kamishli and others.
Latkia and Sectarian Segregation
Amidst the protests, Latkia’s demonstrators showed up holding the same slogans held in other Syrian cities. But things then escalated in a different way. The fear emerged of sectarian violence between the Alawite and Sunni population after armed groups attacked Alawite neighbourhoods where public and private property was destroyed. Those groups identified themselves as Sunni, but the public perceived them as influential gangsters protected by the regime. Some say their violence aimed to create sectarian problems and to prevent people from uniting in rebellion while at the same time planting in them the seeds of fear of any possible change.
However, this did not prevent some figures in the Alawite elite from voicing their fear over what happened and that it might happen again. One can infer here that, even though no real sectarian violence has yet taken place in Syria, the Alawites are really scared of what’s going on. It’s the rebels’ duty to reassure them that the revolution will not take revenge against the Alawite minority, which shares the current regime’s religious identity. The revolution is aimed at the corrupt, repressive figures of authority from all religious sects. And this is how it is seen by the intellectuals’ manifesto, titled “National Promise: Syria the home of all its citizens”.
Apart from those incidents, the revolution has enjoyed memorable scenes of unity and compassion regardless of sect, ethnicity or city of origin. Deraa’s demonstratorss cheered for the martyrs of Latkia and those of Latkia cheered for Deraa, national unity and freedom.
The regime has nevertheless tried to play on sectarian divisions. It actually pushed Sunni clergy affiliated with it to dismiss the protests as an act of treason that served a foreign conspiracy. This is why the demonstrators in Deraa cheered: “Hey Boty and Hassoun, the Syrians are not traitors”. That was their direct reply to Sheikh Ramadan Boty, one of the closest clergymen to the authorities, as well as Sheikh Ahmad Hassoun, the mufti of the republic.
Gangsters and Religious Fundamentalism
Naturally the protestors were labeled by the regime as traitors, armed gangsters, agents of foreign conspirers, and religious fundamentalists. This is what the political advisor of President Bashar Assad, Buthaina Shaaban, said on various occasions. Those accusations pumped up the Syrians’ fury. They felt insulted, especially as their children had been shot at and killed in peaceful demonstrations.
The regime’s message reached its peak of conflict when it started promising to attend to the protestor’s demands, especially regarding lifting the emergency law, while still carrying on with resuming accusations of treason.
The regime appears as if it is trying to release popular and international pressure, but without making any real concessions. It wants its promises to look like favours from the ruling party rather than legitimate people’s rights.
This attitude has caught even the supporters of the regime in a moral and political trap – artists whose loyalty to the regime is well known, and also public figures always ferociously defending it. They have resorted to calling for reforms too, while making sure not to repeat the same accusations as the rebels, but they could not go as far as opposing the ruling regime.
Victims of the Revolution
The videos and photos of dying protestors, shown on TV satellite channels and the internet, have shaped local, public and international opinion. In only two weeks, there are talks of 150 people dead, and hundreds of injuries.
The arrest of hundreds of protestors and activists contributed to the anger. Among the detainees were national figures, lawyers and activists. Nevertheless, the regime continued to promise reform every day.
On the other hand, the shots of people tearing down giant posters of Bashar Assad and the statue of his father Hafez terrified the regime. It showed that the Syrians have broken the barrier of fear, and that their demands might not stop at a little bit more freedom of expression but instead go as far as demanding the end of the regime.
Some demonstrations actually went beyond the demand of ending emergency law and called for the fall of the government.
The Future of the Syrian Revolution
The Syrians have proved, so far, to have great courage and self-awareness. They should know how much they must rely on the peaceful element of their activism. The authorities demonstrated a yo-yo method of combining promises of reform with violence, and at the same time carrying on with the old tactic of forcing students and public sector employees to participate in marches to support the regime.
So what will the coming days look like? What is to become of the Syrian protests? This last question takes on significance since essential groups are not participating, including the Syrian Kurds and the people of Aleppo and Damascus, while the national opposition seems unable to keep up with events.
Experts say the next few days will be crucial to the revolution. Either all the Syrian cities join and real change is achieved, or the whole uprising is contained and the regime reorganises itself around nominal reforms that guarantee its extended shelf life.
It’s hard to predict what will happen next, now that the regime’s hands are stained with blood, although Bashar Assad had managed to prevent this mistake until March 2011.
The Syrians hope that their protests will lead to the fulfillment of their demands and the end of one-party-rule. Many are worried that their hopes are still threatened, despite the sacrifices. But realism would suggest that if not all Syrians join efforts in the mobilisation of protests, which will grow in size and continue over a serious period of time, then the end will not satisfy the rebels.
The coming days carry worry and concern for the people and regime alike, each for its own reasons.
