Tal Abyad Local Council Provokes Resentment, But Security Holds Stable
By Youssef Shaikho
(Tel Abyad, Syria) – On the eve of the fall of the north eastern city of Raqqa to the Syrian opposition in March 2013, the nearby city of Tal Abyad, which had been under rebel control since September 2012, was the site of negotiations between the regime and the opposition over the reactivation of public services.
The governor of Raqqa province, Hassan Jalali, remained loyal to the regime. Despite this, he reached out to the local opposition council to ask that they allow certain vital institutions to function in order to address the city’s basic needs. Jalali requested that the council allow the civil servants to return to their jobs, emphasizing the central government’s readiness to pay their salaries. At the time, the two sides were able to reach an agreement to offer vital services such as water and electricity, as well as post office and health services.
But the agreement was never implemented. The regime would lose Raqqa, and Jalali became a prisoner in the hands of the armed opposition. A newly established Local Council began to nominally run the affairs of Tal Abyad, a town with a population of 35,000. The Local Council consists of 19 seats distributed among the various ethnic groups that inhabit the city: 11 for the Arabs, five for the Kurds, two for the Turkmen, and one Armenian seat that has been vacant since the council was set up. (In February, the council members rotated positions and elected a new head, but the makeup of the council remained the same).
Despite the appearance of local representation and organization, many Tal Abyad residents who spoke to The Damascus Bureau expressed scepticism regarding the Local Council’s legitimacy and independence from the jumble of armed opposition groups in the area.
Among the fighting units in the city are the armed local clans, Islamist Jihadists, and units nominally affiliated with the Free Syrian Army. The most prominent armed factions in Tal Abyad are the Islamic Kataeb Al-Farouq, as well as the Nusra Front and Ghuraba Al-Sham jihadists.
These groups have separate and ill-defined military, judicial and security institutions that are independent from the Local Council. One of these institutions is the Al Haya Al Sharia, which translates roughly as Sharia Council, a religious court established to resolve disputes and bring about some form of law and order. The Sharia Council has a strong influence on security and judicial issues in the city, and its members say that it is independent.
But in reality, locals say, the Sharia court is affiliated with the Al-Nusra Front. The Sharia Council has also allegedly refused the suggestion of the local council to be named a “Legal Council” and also refused to incorporate secular judges or lawyers.
A citizen who spoke on condition of anonymity said the Local Council “cannot exceed the limits imposed on it by the [armed opposition],” and that the armed opposition is “disrupting the local council’s role in providing services and security.”
Former Local Council President Saad Shawish denied that the Local Council is subject to the authority of the insurgents, insisting that its relationship with the rebels has been good from the beginning and there is “cooperation” between the two sides.
He added that the Local Council “derives its legitimacy from the street and not from the Military Council [in Raqqa] or the [opposition] brigades,” but added, “Sometimes we need to help them secure the protection of the city…and there are many things with which we help each other.” The Military Council of Raqqa is a loosely organized body formed by various armed rebel groups, and affiliated with the official leadership of the Free Syrian Army.
Maan al-Khodr, a media activist in Tal Abyad, contested this version, saying the Nusra Front had marginalized the Local Council in security affairs. He says the Local Council had its own security force known as the “Office of National Security” which included volunteers under the supervision of defected police officers, but this force was effectively neutralized following skirmishes with the Nusra front.
“There is no specific body responsible for security,” explained Khodr. “People usually complain to the Sharia Council in the city.”
And even the rebels are splintered and disorganized: Although there are numerous armed opposition groups in the city, the groups still do not follow a unified leadership, which can lead to misunderstandings and confrontations.
“The [rebel] Military Council in the province of Raqqa is very weak and completely ineffective,” said Khodr, adding that the relative stability in the area was thanks to it being dominated by clans and the fact that “everybody knows each other.”
Some Tel Abyad residents are also upset with how the Local Council was selected. They say the Local Council was not chosen by the residents of the city, but by an agreement among the family clans that make up the local fighting units and who took over the administration of the city after the central government in Damascus lost control. This was confirmed by a member of the Council who spoke to The Damascus Bureau on condition of anonymity.
According to the same source, neither the “intellectuals” of Tal Abyad nor the well-known Arab opposition figures were considered for any of the council seats.
Kurds make up about half of Tel Abyad’s population, so Kurdish representation was important. Two of the five Kurdish council members were drawn from the National Kurdish Council, which includes several key Kurdish parties, as well as two members from the People’s Council of West Kurdistan, a subsidiary of the pro-PKK, Democratic Union Party. One independent Kurdish representative is also present on the Local Council.
Saad Shawish, the former Local Council president, defends the council’s record, pointing out that it was formed and started work just five days after the “liberation” of the city.
Shawish said the Local Council secured basic necessities and services such as bread, electricity and drinking water, reopened and stocked government hospitals and other key state institutions. The Local Council supplied aid to the displaced residents living in local schools and the families of “the martyrs and the poor,” he said.
Shawish’s comments were echoed by Khalil Abdullah, an official from the Accommodation Center (Markaz Al Iwaa), an organization that helps provide food and shelter to those in need, and which falls under the Local Council’s Relief Office. Abdullah said that soon after rebels took over the city, the Accommodation Centre received support from a “group of charities,” the most prominent being “We are all for Syria” (Kulluna lil Sham), which provided financial support. The organization also received help from the Turkish Red Crescent, which continues to provide food, in addition to the financing provided by the Tal Abyad Local Council. Abdullah said the Relief Office was able to use these resources to aid the displaced and poor families who were in desperate need of food.
Despite the Local Council members’ insistence that they are working hard to restore services to the city, citizens still complain of their performance. In early April, the city witnessed a sit-in to protest the water being cut off from one of the city’s neighbourhoods.
Tal Abyad resident Ahmed al-Salim told The Damascus Bureau that what matters most to people is security and basic services, neither of which the Local Council has been able to provide. He admitted, however, that Tal Abyad was better off than most of the Jazirah region, which includes the provinces of Hassaka, Deir El-Zor and Raqqa, in terms of basic goods and services.
Residents can buy “all the most basic goods” from Turkey, adding that the Turkish city of Akja is just a few minutes away by foot, and the border is wide open with no customs or visas.
In fact, the border crossing has become a major commercial hub. But according to Local Council officials, the border gate is still under the control of armed rebels; a department within the Local Council that is supposed to run the border is not currently functioning.
